By Emanuele De Gasperis
As we observe daily, the anthropocentric vision and the concept of dominance over nature have led humans to treat the entire planet as an object of greed. This distorted relationship, based on the exercise of power over fellow humans and other living beings, reflects a deeper issue. Often addressed both by the media and institutions, the relationship between human and non-human animals is affected by strong biases due to widespread sensitivities and economic interests. Unfortunately, common sense does not always align with sound judgment or current scientific knowledge, while economic interests often clash with the actual needs of living beings, particularly in terms of animal welfare.
First, we must take into consideration that there are different animal species, and our ways of relating to them differ based on individual sensitivities and cultural contexts. We can speak of animals that live more or less freely in nature, that are confined in zoos, species that have now adapted to urban environments, and wild animals forced to seek food in urban centers due to habitat invasion. There are also animals that have been selectively bred or genetically modified for ornamental purposes or used in experimentation and research.
While sensitivities vary, in our everyday lives we tend to experience two extreme and often paradoxical situations in our relationship with other animals. While we witness the commodification and objectification of living beings as production machines, we also anthropomorphize the so-called “pets”, the small companion animals who live with us.
The terms “pet” and “farm animals” epitomize the distortion we face in relation to non-human animals and our lack of respect for animal life. Pets have entered nearly every household and, notwithstanding an increased sensitivity towards them, our limited knowledge and lack of respect for their needs prevent us from recognizing their species-specific traits and individuality. Consequently, we cannot form healthy and respectful relationships with them. Some breeds are actually mistreated both physically and cognitively, leading us to the issue of suffering breeds and genetic abuse. In some cases, we want them to resemble humans, especially children. The most striking example is provided by brachycephalic breeds, those with ‘flattened faces’. Over time, these breeds have been selected due to the high demand for ‘small’, ‘sweet’, ‘tender’ animals, with round ‘faces’ and ‘large eyes’ – features that satisfy our caregiving (epimeletic) motivation. Yet, many of these dogs struggle to breathe: to comply with aesthetic demands, breeding has exacerbated certain somatic characteristics resulting in real malformations of the airways that often require surgery. This is but one example of how we manipulate the lives of sentient beings for selfish reasons. We often force them to live by human standards. We choose dogs based on their adaptability to human environments, preferring toy breeds, mini toy breeds, and even breeds with less hair not to dirty our homes. We often see that small dogs are denied intraspecific socialization, confined to indoor spaces with pads instead of grass, and offered plush toys as substitutes for social interactions with conspecifics. Besides socialization problems, reproduction in some breeds has become difficult without artificial insemination and cesarean sections. Moreover, predation no longer exists. Socialization, reproduction, and predation – key aspects of animal life – are partially or entirely denied to many animals.
Dog breeds, much like fashion trends, fluctuate in popularity, with factors like health, longevity, and behavior playing hardly any role. In fact, many of the most popular breeds are those prone to serious health and behavioral problems. Despite copious scientific evidence of their suffering, the popularity of some small and medium-sized brachycephalic breeds, such as the Pug, the French Bulldog, and the English Bulldog has continued to rise internationally over the past ten years. The same is happening to cat breeds, such as the Scottish Fold, which suffers from bone problems caused by a genetic mutation. These are but a few examples of the ongoing genetic abuse of animals to meet human aesthetic standards. It is not easy to understand the motivations behind adopting dogs from the so-called “suffering breeds”, but the market determines selection (hence “production”) and the demand is driven by the “consumer”. The contradiction between an increasing sensitivity to animal welfare on the one hand, and a persistent lack of empathy on the other, are two conflicting aspects of our social and moral evolution.
At the opposite extreme of companion animals there are farm animals, namely those raised in intensive farming. Intensive farming prioritises maximum production in minimal space, at the lowest cost and highest profit margin. High-production dairy cows are the most striking example of exploitation, but similar conditions plague poultry and pigs. High-production dairy cows are regarded as machines to be pushed to their physical limits. While intolerable farming conditions have somewhat improved over the past century, economic considerations remain paramount, and attention to animal welfare often ends when profitability is at stake. This mirrors the historical fight for human rights and the abolition of slavery: animal welfare must remain compatible with production; animal welfare cannot jeopardize production, and the condition of “economic sustainability” is non-negotiable. Notwithstanding some improvements, such as broader spaces and the availability of food and water, current farming practices are far from acceptable based on today’s scientific knowledge. For example, genetic selection has led to increased milk production, minimizing genetic variability, with some cows so morphologically altered that even walking becomes difficult due to their oversized udders. Intensive farms operate like ‘factories’, where the rhythm is always the same: constantly alienating. Animals are treated as ‘machines’ – they need vast quantities of fuel (food) to produce a lot and when they are no longer profitable, they are replaced.
Ultimately, we are living in a state of cognitive dissonance regarding our relationship with animals – an issue that requires urgent rethinking. We are no longer in the age of Descartes when most intellectuals and the public believed that non-human animals lacked sensitivity or cognitive abilities. Over a relatively short period, we have selectively bred countless animals, significantly reducing their genetic diversity to create subspecies and/or breeds that meet our needs, whether for food, aesthetics, or companionship. Extreme selection has led to debilitating deformities, often preventing animals from adapting to their living environment. The distortions of what nature has created over millions of years often result in maladaptive, debilitating or even lethal traits. We are facing a serious form of abuse that affects not only individuals but also entire generations and, in some cases, entire species.
While conditions outside of Europe may be worse in terms of animal welfare, in liberal and democratic societies, the rejection of unnecessary suffering is not only embedded in laws and rights but serves as a structural and inspiring principle of democracy itself, which, hopefully, all its members accept and support (Pollo 2021: 69). What constitutes “necessary” suffering can be debated, but the principle must be upheld.
With regard to the genetic abuse of pets, the situation is aggravated by the fact that it is often culturally tolerated although it is totally futile and unnecessary. When it comes to the moral responsibility for this, three categories of citizens can be identified:
- Lawmakers and institutions bear the primary responsibility. The scientific evidence of unnecessary suffering in many breeds is clear, and legislative inaction is no longer acceptable.
- Breeders and traders who continue to perpetuate these injustices, share equal responsibility, even though they operate within the bounds of inadequate legal frameworks.
- Pet owners also bear moral responsibility, which grows in proportion to their awareness of the issue.
In consideration of all this, we urgently need changes at the legislative and cultural levels. Some European countries have already enacted laws that prohibit certain breeds:
- in 2020, the Dutch government banned 12 breeds;
- in 2022, Norway put a legal ban on the breeding of French Bulldogs and Cavalier King Charles Spaniels.
National laws are urgently needed to prevent the continuation of genetic abuse and to address the problem at multiple levels.
However, as long as animals are viewed as legal property, it will be difficult to eliminate the dysfunctional relationships that stem from this view. In addition to banning the breeding of suffering breeds, particularly those classified as pets, perhaps the time has come to shift entirely to a system of adoption or fostering, eliminating the commercial trade in pets. This proposal does not question the concept of ownership per se but rather acknowledges the need for legal reforms that foster respectful relationships with non-human animals, as outlined in Article 3 of the Constitution, which promotes environments conducive to the development of all individuals, human and non-human alike. This abolitionist position is supported by American activist and philosopher Gary Lawrence Francione. While such a vision might still be inapplicable to farm animals for economic and cultural reasons, it is certainly achievable for “pets” or “companion animals”, potentially marking the start of a more virtuous and enlightened path.
The conspicuous and courageous work of Charles Darwin has shattered the illusion of discontinuity between non-human animals and homo sapiens. Yet, beyond anthropocentrism and the exercise of dominance, the banal belief in our radical difference from other animals still has to be culturally dismantled. Modern studies increasingly show that other animals resemble us more than we ever believed, or perhaps, more accurately, that we resemble them more than we previously wanted to admit. Darwin opened a crucial breach, which we cannot obstinately continue to ignore. Today, as we bridge the gap in our knowledge, we must embrace a relationship with animals that recognizes their equal place in the natural world, respecting their otherness.
Throughout history, the moral status of non-human animals has been a contentious issue, with ongoing debates about their inclusion in the moral community. Opinions vary widely – some advocate for full equality between humans and animals, while others continue to see animals as mere objects to be used. These are, of course, extremes. While the debate continues, a key difficulty lies in accepting that animals can possess rights when they are unable to claim them or fulfill corresponding duties. Most often, animals are considered bearers of interests to which we have responsibilities – either directly or indirectly. Laws are generally framed around indirect responsibilities. In fact, in many countries, duties towards animals are viewed not in relation to the animal’s status as a sentient being, but as someone’s property. Once again, what emerges are our duties towards humans: our duties towards animals are merely a collateral result of our obligation not to offend human feelings and sensitivity.
Ethical approaches based on compassion and responsibility are frequently proposed to address these concerns, encouraging empathy and care in treating animals. However, relying solely on individual sensitivity is both naive and insufficient. Without the support of a robust legal framework, it is much more difficult to foster an ethics of care and responsibility.
While zooanthropology seeks to create awareness of the value of cross-species encounters and relationships, encouraging a deeper understanding of animal “otherness”, of its enriching value, perhaps it is time to establish an interspecies agreement that fosters constructive relationships curbing our desire for dominance. Such a “contract” could encourage encounters and relationships promoting cultural and emotional growth.
Interspecies contractualism is an ethical proposal advanced by Donald Van De Veer and inspired by John Rawls’ famous essay A Theory of Justice. Rawls’ contractualist theory, however, applies only at intraspecific level. In fact, since animals are incapable of reciprocity, they are considered outside the bounds of the ethical contract. Peter Singer disputes this argument by citing cases such as severe disabilities or future generations, where reciprocity cannot be expected (Singer 1989: 67). According to Singer, the lack of reciprocity cannot limit the application of the criteria of justice.
Rawls envisioned a hypothetical “original position” where societal norms would be established from a perspective of equality, with individuals “under a veil of ignorance”, unaware of their future roles. In this position, it would be in everyone’s interest to create a society that minimizes injustices and maximizes opportunities.
Not unlike Singer, for Van De Veer the criteria of justice concern all sentient creatures – not exclusively those endowed with a sense of justice. Therefore, he extends Rawls’ theory to all sentient beings. According to this view, the human being must abandon the requirement of reciprocity in ethical relationships with animals, and adopt an impartial perspective, imagining a pre-original position that seeks principles of interspecific justice (De Mori 2013: 64).
Midgley’s criticism of radical antispeciesism (Midgley 1985: 106-121) is accepted by Donald Van De Veer in his proposal for interspecific contractualism (De Mori 2013: 65). The latter envisions a speciesism that is receptive of the interests of sentient beings – a speciesism aware of the differences among species, acknowledging their otherness, and focusing on responsibility, care, and respect. This specisism nurtures the lives of other sentient beings and is willing to renounce reciprocity in order to recognize a moral status and the possibility of interspecies contractualism.
Van De Veer identifies two principles applicable to multiple circumstances: 1. no sentient creature should endure treatment that makes its life not worth living; 2. no rational being should deliberately bring a sentient creature into existence when it is certain, or highly probable, that non-existence would be preferable to existence (De Mori 2013: 65).
It has been objected that the contract should be established between subjects interested in themselves, i.e., that it should be rational and communicable to all subjects. Yet, this is not an insurmountable obstacle, as humans can represent the interests of sentient beings, assuming moral responsibility for their well-being.
Ethical frameworks may vary, but they all contribute to an evolving understanding of our moral obligations to animals. Whether through an ethics of care, compassion, or justice, the fundamental principle is respect for life. Albert Schweitzer, a philosopher, theologian, and Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1952, championed this view more than a century ago. His vision of respect for life is often seen as utopian, as human interests will inevitably conflict with those of other living beings. However, this conflict should arise out of necessity, not frivolous desire. Some decisions will involve tragic choices, but they must be made with the weight of moral responsibility. Even in the preamble to the European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals, concluded in Strasbourg on 13 November 1987, it is written, “Man has a moral obligation to respect all living creatures.” (CETS 125 – European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals (coe.int)). Only in 2010, with the enactment of Law No. 201, did Italy ratify the aforementioned European convention. While this may seem like an abstract ideal, it is a principle that must be taken seriously if we are to create a more just and compassionate world for all sentient beings.
Schweitzer writes:
Respect for life stems from a will to live that has learnt to think; it is, therefore, a YES to life, which becomes collective ethics. Its primary task is to realize progress and to create values that foster the material, spiritual, and ethical growth of both the individual and all of humanity (Schweitzer 1994: 17).
References
CETS 125 – European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals (coe.int) https://rm.coe.int/168007a67d [accessed 02/09/2024]
De Mori B. (2013). Che cos’è la bioetica animale. Rome: Carocci
LEGGE 4 novembre 2010, n. 201 – Normattiva
https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2010-11-04;201 [accessed 02/09/2024]
Pollo S. (2021). Manifesto per un animalismo democratico. Rome: Carocci.
Rawls J. (1999). Una teoria della giustizia. Milan: Feltrinelli.
Schweitzer A. (1994). Rispetto per la vita. Turin: Claudiana.
Singer P. (1989). Etica pratica. Naples: Liguori.
